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Abstract
TASP (Time Average Shapley Polygon, Benaı¯m, Hofbauer and Hopkins, Journal of Economic Theory, 2009), as
a novel evolutionary dynamics model, predicts that a game could converge to cycles instead of fix points (Nash
equilibria). To verify TASP theory, using the four strategy Dekel-Scotchmer games (Dekel and Scotchmer, Journal
of Economic Theory, 1992), four experiments were conducted (Cason, Friedman and Hopkins, Journal of Economic
Theory, 2010), in which, however, reported no evidence of cycles (Cason, Friedman and Hopkins, The Review of
Economic Studies, 2013). We reanalysis the four experiment data by testing the stochastic averaging of angular
momentum in period-by-period transitions of the social state. We find, the existence of persistent cycles in Dekel-
Scotchmer game can be confirmed. On the cycles, the predictions from evolutionary models had been supported by
the four experiments.
JEL classification: C72; C73; C92; D83
Keywords: Experiments; Dekel and Scotchmer game; period by period transition; angular momentum; stochastic
averaging
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1. Introduction
While facing a game, the first step is to look for Nash
equilibra (fixed points) [3], but in some condition, in-
stead of fix points, a game could converge to cycles.
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Figure 1: Cyclic trajectory and its angular momentum. (a) Ideal
Dekel-Scotchmer cycle (refer to the Figure 1 in p396 in [1]) and (b)
Time Average Shapley Polygon (TASP) (refer to the Figure 1 in p2313
in [2]) for unstable RPSD game. The frequencies of strategies P and
S are on the horizontal axes and of strategy D on the vertical axis.
The red arrows indicate the accumulated angular momentum (vector)
respects to the cycles.
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As an example in evolutionary game theory catalog,
recently, a dynamic theory — Time Average Shapley
Polygon (TASP) theory [4] — is built giving a precise
prediction about non-equilibrium play in games. To
test TASP theory, four exemplified experiments of the
Dekel-Scotchmer game [1], called also as Rock-Paper-
Scissors-Dumb (RPSD) games [2], were conducted by
Cason et al. [2]. The four experiments game were multi
round repeated, set as discrete time (instead of continu-
ous time as [5]), at the same time the matching protocol
are randomly pair-wised which called as evolutionary
protocol [6, 7]. In the four experiments, some evidences
supporting TASP are found. But no cycle is reported in
[2], which is emphasized by the authors in their recent
literature [5]. In fact, this is the second time for the cy-
cles in the Dekel-Scotchmer game was declined in ex-
periments. This game had firstly been tested in experi-
ments, no cycles was found which was also emphasised
by the authors [6] (We go back this point in discussion,
section 4). All these seems to suggest that there is no
cycle in the four Dekel-Scotchmer game experiment.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, cycle should along R, P, S , R,
P ... in the RPS plane in the tetrahedronthe state space
of the Dekel and Scotchmer game. Since the game
was designed [1], not only TASP, variants evolutionary
models has expected the cycle [4, 1, 8, 9, 10]. Empiri-
cally, as in biology system [11, 12], in experimental eco-
nomics, evolutionary models have been supported ex-
tensively [13, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Recently, in the discrete
time protocol, the cycles have been constantly tested out
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. So, it is enigma
that using the similar protocol in the four experiments,
why does the RPS cycle not exist. The objective of this
paper was to study whether or not cycle exists the four
Dekel-Scotchmer game experiments.
The four experiments have a 2 × 2 design [2] shown
in Table 1. The first design is the two game matrix.
Both settings are Dekel-Scotchmer game constructed
from the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game with the ad-
dition of a fourth strategy called Dumb (D). The payoff
matrix can be presented as
R P S D
R
P
S
D

a 0 b c
b a 0 c
0 b a c
d d d 0

.
For Unstable and Stable games, [a b c d] equals to [90
120 20 90] and [60 150 20 90], respectively. Both games
have the same unique Nash-Dumb (the probability to
choose Dumb is 1/2, shown as the redline in Fig. 2). The
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Figure 2: The relation between observed average angular momentum
( ¯Lx, ¯Ly, ¯Lz) and observed average play of D (PD, see also the Table
1 in [2]). Observed ( ¯Lx, ¯Ly, ¯Lz) can be obtained from k=1 rows in
Table 3. Red line is Nash equilibrium Dumb (D-play). Color [yel-
low, purple, blue, green] presents game-[0,1,2,3], respectively. Sym-
bol (,×,+) represents ( ¯Lx, ¯Ly, ¯Lz) respectively. Enlarged symbols
are the averages by games and smaller by sessions.
second design is two conversion rates of Experimen-
tal Francs (the entries in the game matrix) to US Dol-
lars. In the High-pay (Low-pay) treatment, 100 EF =
$5 ($2). In High-pay games, the monetary incentive for
optimal strategy is stronger and less noise is expected.
Mainly, the settings of the four game are summarized as
shown in Table 1. While these games are identical in
their equilibrium predictions, they differ quite substan-
tially in terms of predicted learning behavior The stable
games (game-2,3) would converge to the Nash equilib-
rium. At the same time, in the unstable game (game-
0, 1), play will approach to a cycle (in RPS-plane, see
green triangle in Fig. 3) in which there would be no
weight placed on the strategy Dumb (D). So, the correc-
tion of TASP can be evaluated [2] by the average play
of D (PD). The main result [2], as illustrated in y-axis in
Fig 2, PD in game-1 leaves Nash Dumb the farthest and
game-2 the closest. These meet TASP theory well.
Cycles are also expected by TASP theory (Fig.1) in
these four games. The theoretical arguments of the fic-
titious learning model have been well analyzed [2] ——
For the game treatment, as the basic argument (p.2312
in [2]), in the stable game there would be convergence
to the Nash equilibrium. In the unstable game, however,
there will be divergence from equilibrium and play will
approach a cycle in which no weight is placed on the
strategy Dumb (D). For the payoff treatment, high-pay
has the same effect as an increase in the noise param-
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Table 1: The four games (treatments)
game i.d. Low pay High pay
Unstable 0 ← 1
↓ ↓
Stable 2 ← 3
Each game has 3 repeated sessions with 12 subjects in each session. Game
in each session is about 80 times repeated. Matching protocol is randomly
pairwise. On cycle expected by RPS-CH, a → b presents the strength in
game-a larger than that in game-b ( ¯La > ¯Lb). The related empirical results are
shown in Table 4.
eter (p.2317 in [2]) —— Accordingly, the quantitative
expectation is that the more deviation from equilibrium,
the more cyclic motion will be, which forms the second
testable point following presented by Table 1. For the
objective of this paper, the expectation on cycle could
be decomposed into three testable hypothesis:
(1) Cycles exist only along R, P, S ,R,... direction
shown in Fig. 3 and Table 2. Explanation for this
testable points see section 2.4. The results, see section
3.1, support this point.
(2) Cycles’ strength depends on games, shown in
Table 1, in which game-1 is the largest. Results, see
section 3.2, support this point.
(3) Cycles’ persistence depends on games, in which
game-1 performs the best. Results, see section 3.3,
support this point.
These three hypothesis are tested in this paper. Using
angular momentum (an observation of rotation in clas-
sical physics), in the period-by-period transitions (PPT)
of social state in the four experiments [2], we test the
cycles and find that all the three theoretical arguments
are supported in significant. we hope our observation
can provides an exemplified evidence of the existence
of Dekel-Scotchmer cycles.
2. Methods
2.1. State space settings
There are four pure strategies in the game, therefore
we use a four dimensional (4D) vector (x, y, z, u) to de-
note a generic social state of the population, where x, y,
z and u are the fractions of players using strategy R, P S
and D, respectively [19, 16]. The fraction must be one
element in (0, 1/N, 2/N..., 1) set in an N-players game.
There are 4 pure social states which can be denoted as
Wi (i ∈ {R, P, S ,D}). At the same time, the sum of the
fractions is 1 (x + y + z + u=1), the 4D space is con-
strained. Hence, it can be projected into a 3D space.
Figure 3: Social state space of the RPSD game in 3D representation.
Each social state is represented by a (blue) dot. Each k1, k2 , k3 , k4
setting, see the x − y − z; O-column in Table 2, is illustrate as a sub-
figure. The green triangle is the RPS-plane. The red arrow indicating
L-direction if the net notations are along R→P→S →R (expected by
TASP theory see the (Lx, Ly, Lz)-columns in Table 2). For example, in
k2 setting, the red arrow is (0,0,1) which means (Lx = 0, Ly = 0, Lz >
0) are expected.
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By the permuting D,R, P, S at O=(0,0,0) and other
three at x, y, z-axis respectively, there could have four
ways (denoted as k1, k2, k3, k4) to realize the projections.
See column-(x, y, z; O) in Table 2 for the assignments.
The four 3D spaces can be presented graphically as a
trirectangular tetrahedron lattice1 as illustrated in Fig. 3.
2.2. Period-by-period transition (PPT)
In such lattice space, generically speaking, the ob-
served social state depends on time. From one period (t)
to its next period (t + 1), one social state transition from
x(t) to x(t + 1) , called as one period-by-period transi-
tion (PPT), can be observed. Each PPT is a 3D vector in
the lattice space. Successive PPT vectors form an evo-
lutionary trajectory in 3D. For example, in a 80 rounds
experimental sessions, an evolutionary trajectory of 80
nodes in which there are 79 PPT can be obtained.
2.3. Angular momentum in PPT
For simplicity we consider first a particle (with mass
m=1) moving with respect to a specific reference point
(denoted as o). Consider one PPT, from x(t) to x(t + 1),
the instantaneous angular momentum vector L(t) can be
expressed as [21]
L(t) = [x(t) − o] × [x(t+1) − o] , (1)
in which symbol × means cross product of the two vec-
tors. So, L(t) has a magnitude equal to the area of the
parallelogram with edges [x(t) − o] and [x(t+1) − o],
has the attitude of the plane spanned by [x(t) − o] and
[x(t+1) − o], and has orientation being the sense of the
rotation that would align [x(t) − o] with [x(t+1) − o]. It
does not have a definite location or position [28]. No
lose of the generality, the random mixed (1,1,1,1)/4 is
used as the reference point to report the following re-
sults.2
This measurement can be interpreted as following.
In equilibrium, in long run, the time average of L (de-
noted as ¯L) is 0, because of the detailed balance in PPT
[18, 29]. In non-equilibrium, ¯L should be significantly
different from zero which provides combinative cycles’
information (strength and direction of rotation) of the
1 In the studied case of N=12 and each subject can choose one in
four pure strategy in one period, the total number of different observ-
able social states is ∏3i=1
[
i−1(N + i)
]
= 455. These states form the
state space (lattice).
2L vector is reference point (o) depended in one PPT. It is no dif-
ficult to prove that, ¯L of a closed loop is independent of reference
point setting. To test the robustness of the results in Table 3, Table
5 and Table 4, the reference point has been set for all the 455 states,
respectively. The results are consistent.
”tumbling cycles”. This way is to proceed from the mi-
croscopic level motions to the macro level observation
by stochastic averaging [30, 31, 32, 33] over PPT.
In our studies case, there are three components
(Lx, Ly, Lz) of an L. Each component describes the rota-
tion along its own directions respectively. So, each PPT
can provide one sample in each of the three directions
respectively. In sufficient samples, if a component ¯Lw
(w ∈ {x, y, z}) deviates from 0 with the statistic signifi-
cance, cycles exist in the direction.
As mentioned above, to our study case, we have four
coordination settings (k1, k2, k3, k4). For different set-
tings, the observable ¯Lw (w ∈ {x, y, z}) of a experimental
trajectory should be different.
2.4. Construct the testable points table
The testable points tables are Table 2 and Table 3.
Lets see an example for constructing the testable points
tables.
If the R, P and S are at (0,0,0), (1,0,0) and (0,1,0)
respectively (setting k2, see Table 2), in long run, the
only ¯L components deviating from 0 with the statistic
significance should be Lz. Because, TASP predicts that
cycles exist only in the X-Y plane along R,P,S,R.... Ac-
cording to L definition in Eq 1, observed L should have
only the component on the Z direction upwards. This
can be shown in k2 setting in Fig. 3 and k=2 condition
in Table 2. In same way, for each of the (k1, k2, k3, k4)
setting, expected observation of L can be represented as
red arrows in Fig. 3. At the same time, in matrix form,
testable expectations on these four settings are shown in
Table 2 too.
In summary, for the four games and four coordination
setting, RPS-CH falls into 48 (3 L-components × 4 co-
ordination settings × 4 games) testable points listed in
the right-most three columns in Table 3.3 Respectively,
present the evolutionary trajectory in four coordination
settings, then we measure the L using Eq. 1 for the four
games in in the experiments. Then, we can compare the
actual motion with the three hypothesis above.
3 Actually, disregarding the 4D→3D projection, the game is 4D,
cross production of two 4D vectors is an antisymmetric tensor having
6 components. Each of the 6 components is an observable and inde-
pendent. So, in four games, only 24 test points are independent. For
brevity, the measurements and the results are presented without this
compression. Regular 3-simplex (normal tetrahedron structure) rep-
resentation is also suitable for a RPSD strategy game in general. But
decomposing vector L in normal tetrahedron structure could lead to
additional complexity to visualize.
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Table 2: Testable TASP hypothesis on ¯Lx, ¯Ly, ¯Lz
Setting (k) x-y-z; O ¯Lx ¯Ly ¯Lz
1 R-P-S ; D + + +
2 P-S -D; R © © +
3 S -D-R; P © – ©
4 D-R-P; S + © ©
Setting three of the four pure strategies along column x-y-z [ex = (1, 0, 0),
ey = (0, 0, 1), ez = (0, 0, 1)], meanwhile, O state assigned at (0,0,0). Testable
hypotheses (PRS-CH) are in last 3 columns in which ’+’ (’–’) or © means the
Lw should along (oppose to) w-axis direction or not deviating from 0.
Table 3: Experimental ( ¯Lx, ¯Ly, ¯Lz)×10−3 in four setting
k game ¯Lx ¯Ly ¯Lz px py pz
1 0 4.5 4.0 5.2 +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗
1 1 6.7 8.0 6.4 +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗
1 2 3.9 4.2 3.3 +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗
1 3 5.2 5.5 4.2 +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗ +∗∗∗
2 0 0.5 -0.7 4.5 © © +∗∗∗
2 1 -1.3 0.3 6.7 © © +∗∗∗
2 2 -0.3 0.7 3.9 © © +∗∗∗
2 3 -0.3 1.0 5.2 © © +∗∗∗
3 0 1.2 -4.0 0.5 © –∗∗∗ ©
3 1 -1.5 -8.0 -1.3 © –∗∗∗ ©
3 2 -1.0 -4.2 -0.3 © –∗∗∗ ©
3 3 -1.3 -5.5 -0.3 © –∗∗∗ ©
4 0 5.2 0.7 1.2 +∗∗∗ © ©
4 1 6.4 -0.3 -1.5 +∗∗∗ © ©
4 2 3.3 -0.7 -1.0 +∗∗ © ©
4 3 4.2 -1.0 -1.3 +∗∗∗ © ©
Superscript [(.) , (∗), (∗∗), (∗∗∗)] represents p less than [0.2, 0.1, 0.05, 0.01].
pw-values coming from one-sample ttest with null hypothesis that the
population mean ¯Lw is equal to 0. The sample sizes for each test point are the
total number of PPT and are [237, 217, 237, 237] for game-[0,1,2,3],
respectively.
Table 4: |L| and cross game comparison for (Lx, Ly, Lz) ×10−3
game |L| 1 2 3
0 7.9 –◦,–∗∗,–∗ –,+,– –,–,+
1 12.2 +◦,+∗∗,+∗∗ +,+,+∗
2 6.6 –,–,–
3 8.7
Compare (Wilcoxon rank sum) cycle strength of the game in row to the game
in column. For example, the symbol (–◦) in 3rd column means Lx in game-0 is
smaller than game-1 (at p < 0.2). Definition of the superscript is as Table 3.
Table 5: Time dependence of ¯L(1,1,1) ×10−3
game ¯L(1,1,1)1,40 ¯L
(1,1,1)
41,80 ∆
¯L(1,1,1) Samples
0 7.5 1.7 -5.8∗∗∗ (351, 351)
1 7.1 6.9 -0.2 (351, 321)
2 4.9 2.7 -2.2 (351, 351)
3 5.1 4.3 -0.8 (351, 351)
(a, b) in Samples column indicates the samples from (1st,2nd)-half periods in
the game sessions. Statistic uses ttest with ∆ ¯L=0
3. Results
3.1. Cycle existence and direction
Result: Cycles exist and only exist paralleling RPS-
plane in all of the 4 game experiments. Cyclic evolu-
tions are along RPS R... in all of the 4 game experi-
ments.
Support material: Statistics results of (Lx, Ly, Lz),
from 4 settings and games respectively, are shown in
Table 3. In k1 setting, the full D strategy is settle at
(0,0,0). All the three components (Lx, Ly, Lz) > 0 sig-
nificant (p < 0.05) for all of the 4 games. In k2 set-
ting, only Lz > 0 is statistically significant (p < 0.05).
A straightforward interpretation is that cycle exists and
only exist in RPS-plane too. This result is supported by
k3 setting and k4 setting. Comparing the theoretical ex-
pectations (Table 2) and empirical results (2), RPS-CH
is supported at all of the 48 testable points.
The direction of existed cycles can be distinguished
by taking the signal of (Lx, Ly, Lz) into account. Empir-
ical signal (+ or – in Table 3) of (Lx, Ly, Lz), comparing
with RPS-CH signal (+ or – in Table 2) by the k-settings
and games respectively, one can find that RPS-CH is
supported excellently at all of the 48 testable points too.
3.2. Cycle strength
Result: Strength of cyclic motion in game-1 (unsta-
ble and High-pay) is the largest. Strength of cycles is
negatively dependent on PD (average play of Dumb).
Support material: The rotation strength of cycles can
be quantified by the vector mode | ¯L|≡( ¯L2x + ¯L2y + ¯L2z )1/2.
The game-1 has the largest rotation strength |L| shown
in the 2nd-column of Table 4. This result is also
supported by the statistical test (Wilcoxon rank sum)
by pair games comparison. In Table 4, over the 4
game, the strength orders can be compared with the
arrows in Table 1. All the results meet RPS-CH [2] well.
Strength of cycles is negatively dependent on PD (av-
erage play of Dumb). At the same time, the result in
Fig. 2 has to be explained —— Strength of cycles is
negatively dependent on PD (average play of Dumb).
This finding is statistically significant.4
4In session level, there is 12 samples (n=12) for each Lw. OLE test
results is that the negative dependence significant with (px, py, pz) <
(0.05, 0.05, 0.05). This relationship can be partly interpreted by a dis-
crete time Logit dynamics model [18]. In tens of dynamics (or learn-
ing) models (e.g., [34, 35]), which could meet all these empirical ob-
servations better is unaware.
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3.3. Cycle persistence
Result: Persistence of cycle in game-1 performs best.
Except game-0, persistence of cycle can not be rejected
by data.
Support material: One way to test the persistence of
cycles is to compare L samples in early and latter peri-
ods. In session level, the hypothesis (L1,40 = L41,80) can
not be rejected in general.5
At game level to test the persistence, we can project
(Lx, Ly, Lz) into (1,1,1)-vector in k1 setting to build a
combinative scale L(1,1,1). For L(1,1,1)1,40 and L
(1,1,1)
41,80 com-
parison, both have 351 samples6, and results are shown
in Table 5. One unexpected7 result is: in two low-pay
treatment, L(1,1,1) in game-0 declines significantly and
more strongly than that in game-2. Nevertheless, in the
four treatments, cycle persistence in game-1 has the best
performance, which meets TASP theory again.
4. Discussion
In the four exemplified experiments [2], firstly in this
paper, the Dekel-Scotchmer cycles are reported. We
looked and we see behavior with many of the properties
the theorists [4, 1, 8, 9] told us that we would see. To
the best of our knowledge, no only in Dekel-Scotchmer
game, no cycle has been reported in any four strategy
games before. These observed cycles, together with the
cycles obtained in recent experiments [18, 19, 5], we
wish, could provide a novel way to merger the expected
and the actual motions.
In experiments, cycle, as the typical non-equilibrium
phenomena, have been long sought but the necessary
condition for its existence is unclear [16, 5, 18]. In this
view, current paper could server as the third exempli-
fied evidence between the two condition (the continu-
ous time and full information environments [5] and the
discrete time and only local information environments
[18]). In the experiment investigated here, the time is
discrete but the information is full. Nevertheless, the
necessary conditions for cycle existence is still an open
question.
5In total 36 samples (4 games × 4 sessions/game × 3 components
of ¯L), only one sample can be rejected ( ¯Ly in the second session in
game-0, p=0.036<0.05) , or in other words the persistence cycles can
not be rejected in other 35 samples.
6The 351 samples include the samples from 3 L-component × 39
period/session × 3 sessions/game. But game 1 is 30 samples less be-
cause there are only 70 periods in its 3 sessions. See [2] for the details.
7Referring to TASP experiment designer’s expectation, in the un-
stable treatments beliefs (on actions) should (more) continue to cycle.
In closed related literatures, as mentioned [5, 16], ex-
perimental work is surprisingly sparse. But one result,
which is straightly contrasty to our results reported here,
has to be reminded. Before [2], a series of RPSD games
had been tested experimentally in 1999 by Von Huyck
et.al. [6]. One remarkable result is that: The subjects
don’t exhibit the kind of correlated behavior predicted
by the dynamic (p139 in [6]). Then, a conclusion was
emphasized: A lesson from the experiment is that one
should discount models that predict deterministic cycles
(p148 in [6]). On the contrary, referring to the cycles
observed from [5] data, we suggest that their results on
the cycle in their data [6] are worth of being rechecked.8
Using cycle in Dekel-Scotchmer game as the exempli-
fied calibration, we suggest, there has many cycles has
been existed in existed experiment data.
For further investigations on the cycles of social mo-
tion, between laboratory experiments and evolutionary
game theory, one central question is still: Whether the
actual motions coincide with the expected motions and
vise versa? As illustrated in [18, 5] the evolutionary
trajectory can be calculated analytically or numerically
based on a evolutionary model, so cyclic behaviors can
be predicted theoretically. Together with stationary ob-
servations of a game (e.g., mean observations [36] and
distribution in strategy space [19, 16]), observations of
cycles (e.g. L in this paper, frequency of cycle [18] and
CRI [5]) can server as a set of calibrations to constraint
game models.
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